From reasonable preferences, via argumentation, to logic

Justine Jacot , Emmanuel Genot , Frank Zenker


This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.
Author Justine Jacot
Justine Jacot,,
, Emmanuel Genot
Emmanuel Genot,,
, Frank Zenker (FASS / DPEA)
Frank Zenker,,
- Department of Philosophy and Ethics in Administration
Journal seriesJournal of Applied Logic, ISSN 1570-8683
Issue year2016
Publication size in sheets1.15
Keywords in EnglishArgumentation; Game theory; Dialogical logic; Game-theoretic semantics; Bounded rational players; Inference; Pragma-dialectics
ASJC Classification2604 Applied Mathematics; 2609 Logic
Languageen angielski
Not used for evaluationyes
Score (nominal)0
Publication indicators WoS Citations = 2; GS Citations = 2.0; Scopus SNIP (Source Normalised Impact per Paper): 2016 = 0.868; WoS Impact Factor: 2016 = 0.838 (2) - 2016=0.839 (5)
Citation count*2 (2020-08-23)
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