From reasonable preferences, via argumentation, to logic
Justine Jacot , Emmanuel Genot , Frank Zenker
AbstractThis article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.
|Journal series||Journal of Applied Logic, ISSN 1570-8683, (A 20 pkt)|
|Publication size in sheets||1.15|
|Keywords in English||Argumentation; Game theory; Dialogical logic; Game-theoretic semantics; Bounded rational players; Inference; Pragma-dialectics|
|Not used for evaluation||yes|
|Publication indicators||: 2016 = 0.868; : 2016 = 0.838 (2) - 2016=0.839 (5)|
|Citation count*||2 (2019-12-07)|
* presented citation count is obtained through Internet information analysis and it is close to the number calculated by the Publish or Perish system.