Direct Minimum-Uplift Model for Pricing Pool-Based Auction With Network Constraints
AbstractAuctions with non-convexities, as considered in this paper, use a multi-period optimal power flow (OPF) model based on generators' offers to calculate efficient schedules. The standard locational marginal prices (LMPs) may not support these schedules and uplifts are needed to help the generators break even. This paper presents a direct minimum-uplift (DMU) pricing model, which is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming problem with uplift minimization objective. New DMU prices are major variables constrained with decomposition formula based on shift factors, similar to the actual practice of developing LMPs. The remaining constraints reflect the generators' profits and uplifts modeled as functions of the DMU prices. The main feature of the DMU model is individual rationality attained in pool-based auction, under prices properly reflecting network constraints, complemented with minimum uplifts. The model is validated on several cases, including the IEEE 24-node system.
|Journal series||IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, ISSN 0885-8950|
|Publication size in sheets||0.5|
|Keywords in English||Centralized auction, market clearing, non-convexities, opportunity cost, unit commitment|
|project||Development of methodology of control, decision support and production management. Project leader: Zieliński Cezary,
, Phone: 5102, start date 19-05-2015, end date 31-12-2016, 504/02233/1031, Completed
|Score|| = 45.0, 27-03-2017, ArticleFromJournal|
= 45.0, 27-03-2017, ArticleFromJournal
|Publication indicators||: 2016 = 5.68 (2) - 2016=7.26 (5)|
|Citation count*||0 (2016-09-19)|
* presented citation count is obtained through Internet information analysis and it is close to the number calculated by the Publish or Perish system.